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CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
WILLIAM S. DODGE*
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) grants U.S. district courts jurisdiction
over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' In Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain,2 the Supreme Court held that the ATS allows U.S.
courts to recognize federal common law causes of actions "based on the
present-day law of nations (that] rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized," specifically, infringement of the rights of ambassadors,
violations of safe-conducts, and piracy.3 Sosa involved claims against a
natural person. Now, eight years later, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.,4 the Court has taken up the question of whether a corporation can
be held liable under the ATS.
In the decision below, the Second Circuit answered "no" to that
question. "Because corporate liability is not recognized as a 'specific,
universal, and obligatory' norm," the majority concluded, "it is not a
rule of customary international law that we may apply under the ATS."
5
In an amicus brief on corporate liability filed with the Supreme Court,
the United States argued to the contrary that a corporation can be held
liable in a suit under the ATS for violating the law of nations. According
to the United States, the Second Circuit approached the international
law question in the wrong way. That court should not have "examined
the question of corporate liability in the abstract," but should have
looked instead to see "whether any of the particular international-law
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Counselor on
International Law, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. The views expressed
here are in my personal capacity and, except to the extent they coincide with the amicus brief on
corporate liability filed by the United States, do not necessarily reflect the views of the State
Department or of the United States. © 2012, William S. Dodge.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
2. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
3. Id. at 725.
4. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-1491), arguedFeb.
28, 2012, restored to calendar for reargunent, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491). The Court is
expected to decide Kiobelin the 2012 Term.
5. Kiobe4 621 F.3d at 145 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
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norms [at issue] ... exclude corporations from their scope. ''6 It is these
fundamentally different ways of looking at corporate liability under
customary international law that are the subject of this piece.
From the outset, the Second Circuit majority framed the question of
corporate liability under the ATS as turning on "the existence of a norm
of corporate liability under customary international law."7 In concluding
that no such norm exists, the court found it "particularly significant...
that no international tribunal of which we are aware has ever held a
corporation liable for a violation of the law of nations."8 The court also
observed "that the relatively few international law treaties that impose
particular obligations on corporations do not establish corporate liabil-
ity as a 'specific, universal, and obligatory' norm of customary interna-
tional law."9 After noting that the works of publicists are relevant "not
for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to
be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is," 10 the court
concluded that "corporate liability is not recognized as a 'specific,
universal, and obligatory' norm."11 As these passages make clear, the
Second Circuit majority was searching for a general norm of corporate
liability: a trans-substantive rule that would apply regardless of the
particular international law violation alleged.
International law does not work that way. It does not contain general
norms of liability or non-liability applicable to categories of actors.
International law does, of course, include doctrines of immunity. For
example, states are generally immune from suit in the courts of other
states unless an exception applies, as are certain high-ranking officials
(like heads of state) during their tenure in office. However, as the
International Court of Justice has reaffirmed only recently in the
Jurisdictional Immunities case, "rules of State immunity are procedural"
and "do not bear upon the question whether or not the conduct in
respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful.'
12
Thus, "immunity can have no effect on whatever responsibility [a state]
6. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 21, Kiobel, No.
10-1491 (U.S. filed Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter U.S. KiobelBrief].
7. Kiobe, 621 F.3d at 131 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 132.
9. Id. at 141 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
10. Id. at 142 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734).
11. Id. at 145 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
12. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 93 (Feb. 3, 2012),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf.
[Vol. 431046
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may have." 3 In other words, a state that is immune from suit is still
capable of violating international law and, despite its immunity, re-
mains responsible for such violations. Corporations generally have no
immunity under international law, 14 much less benefit from a trans-
substantive rule of non-liability that even states do not enjoy.
On the other hand, particular norms of customary international law
do sometimes apply to some actors and not to others. The norm against
torture, for example, is commonly said to apply to state actors but not
to non-state actors, though in fact the formal distinction in interna-
tional law is between those who act with a sufficient connection to the
state and those who do not. Historically, the seizure of a ship, which
would constitute piracy, was instead considered privateering (and
therefore lawful under the law of nations) if the captor carried a valid
commission. 15 Violations of the law of nations on neutrality depended
on the actor being the citizen of a neutral nation.16 Thus, as the U.S.
brief explained, "a court must conduct a norm-by-norm assessment to
determine whether the actor being sued is within the scope of the
identified norm."17
Looking at the norms that are actionable under Sosa, the United
States noted that none of these norms "requires, or necessarily contem-
plates, a distinction between natural and juridical actors."1 8 These
norms focus on acts without regard to the identity of the perpetrator.
The Torture Convention, for example, defines "torture" to include
"any act by which severe pain or suffering ... is intentionally inflicted
on a person" for particular purposes,19 the Genocide Convention
defines "genocide" to include "any of the following acts" committed
13. Id. 108. See also Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo
v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 60 (Feb. 14) ("Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual
criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in
nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well
bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to
whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.").
14. Under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a foreign corporation is entitled to
immunity if it is majority-owned by a foreign state, unless an exception applies. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(b) (2006).
15. SeeThe Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 16 (1827).
16. SeeTalbotv.Jansen, 3 U.S. 133, 153-54 (1795) (Patterson,J.).
17. U.S. KiobelBrief, supra note 6, at 18.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113-14 (emphasis added).
2012] 1047
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with the intent to destroy a group,20 and Common Article 3 prohibits as
war crimes "the following acts."
21
To be sure, these Conventions sometimes refer to natural persons.
However, the references to "he" and "him" in Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the
Torture Convention relate to a state party's treaty obligation to pros-
ecute or extradite, not to the customary international law definition of
the prohibition against torture reflected in Article 1. A similar point
applies to Article IV of the Genocide Convention, which obligates states
parties to ensure that "[p] ersons committing genocide or any of the
other acts enumerated in [A] rticle III shall be punished, whether they
are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private indi-
viduals." Article IV provides who shall be punished, not who shall not be
punished, and its purpose was to confirm that the prohibition against
genocide applies to both government officials and private persons.
Nothing in Article IV limits to particular actors the applicability of the
customary international law norm against genocide reflected in Article
II of the Convention.
It is true that some norms of international law (though not genocide
or war crimes) require state action. However, as the U.S. brief points
out, "[b] oth natural persons and corporations can violate international-
law norms that require state action. And both natural persons and
corporations can violate international-law norms that do not require
state action."22
The corporate defendants in Kiobel take a somewhat different ap-
proach from the Second Circuit. They argue that it is the plaintiffs'
burden to "show that international law recognizes corporate liability
under the international norms at issue."23 Of course, that argument
begs the question of what evidence would be sufficient to meet such a
burden. As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law notes, interna-
tional agreements like the Torture, Genocide, and Geneva Conven-
tions "may lead to the creation of customary international law when
such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. II, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (emphasis added).
21. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 (emphasis added).
22. U.S. KiobelBrief, supra note 6, at 21.
23. Brief for Respondents at 3, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. filed
Jan. 27, 2012).
[Vol. 431048
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are in fact widely accepted. 24 In Sosa, the Court held that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights did not "themselves establish the relevant and
applicable rule of international law," because the former does not
impose binding obligations and the latter is non-self-executing. 25 How-
ever, the Court also noted that the Universal Declaration "has neverthe-
less had substantial indirect effect on international law."
26
Even if one were to limit the evidence of customary international law
to state practice applying a particular norm, state practice applying a
norm to natural persons can generate customary international law that
binds juridical persons. To see why this is so, consider the analogy that
Justice Kagan drew at oral argument between corporations and Norwe-
gians. She posited a case in which the defendant argued that "this norm
of international law does not apply to Norwegians" because "there's no
case about Norwegians. 27 Most people would reject that argument out
of hand. Because there is no relevant difference between Paraguayans
and Norwegians, one may rely on state practice applying the norm
against torture to Paraguayans to generate a rule of customary interna-
tional law that binds Norwegians.
In the corporate context, the question is whether there is a relevant
difference between natural persons and juridical persons, such that
state practice applying a particular norm to natural persons would not
establish a rule of customary international law binding juridical per-
sons. The norms that are actionable under Sosa prohibit acts that are
both specifically defined and universally condemned-acts like torture,
genocide, and war crimes. Such differences as exist between natural
and juridical persons are simply irrelevant to these norms, which
categorically prohibit all such conduct. At oral argument, Justice Kagan
answered her hypothetical about international law and Norwegians by
observing that "of course, [the norm against torture] applies to Norwe-
gians because it prevents everybody from committing a certain kind of
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 102(3) (1987). See also id. cmt. i
(noting that "[
i]
nternational agreements constitute practice of states and as such can contribute
to the growth of customary law").
25. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 735 n.23. See generally Chim ne I. Keitner, "Cheap Talk" about Customay International
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUriY AND CHANGE 496-98 (David L.
Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011) (discussing Sosa's treatment of customary
international law evidence).
27. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491
(U.S. argued Feb. 28, 2012).
10492012]
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act."28 The same is true of corporations.
This point finds confirmation in the laws of the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, the Kiobeldefendants' home countries. Following the
adoption of the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal
Court (ICC), both countries passed domestic legislation criminalizing
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes-the offenses
subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC.2 9 The Dutch act additionally
criminalized torture, which was already an offense under U.K. law.50
Significantly, both countries provide that, as a general matter, criminal
law prohibitions apply to corporations as well as to natural persons,31
and neither the Netherlands nor the United Kingdom has exempted
corporations from their statutes criminalizing violations of these funda-
mental norms of customary international law.3 2
As the U.S. brief noted, "[o]nce it is established that the interna-
tional norm applies to conduct by an actor, it is largely up to each state
to determine for itself whether and how that norm should be enforced
in its domestic law." 33 This means that it is permissible for the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom to impose criminal liability on corpora-
tions for torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It
also means that it is permissible for the United States to impose civil
liability on corporations for the same violations of customary interna-
tional law.
In sum, the question of corporate liability under customary interna-
tional law does not depend on finding a norm of customary interna-
tional law in the abstract, but rather on whether the particular norms at
issue reach corporations. None of the norms that are actionable under
Sosa distinguish between natural and juridical persons; all of them
28. Id.
29. See Wetsvoorstel Internationale Misdrijven [International Crimes Act of 2003] Stb. 2003,
p. 270 § 2, arts. 3-7 (Neth.); International Criminal Court Act, 2001, c. 17, § 51 (U.K.).
30. See International Crimes Act of 2003 § 2, art. 8; CriminalJustice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 134(1)
(U.K.).
31. See SR [Criminal Code] § 51(2) (Neth.) (providing that "[i]f a criminal act is committed
by a legal person, prosecution can take place"); Interpretation Act, 1978, c. 30, § 5, sch. I (U.K.)
(stating that "unless a contrary intention appears" the word "'person' includes a body of persons
corporate or unincorporated").
32. See generally ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, FAFO, COMMERCE, CRIME AND
CONFUCT: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LiABILxTY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw-A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN COUNTRIES-ExECUTWE SUMMARY 13-16, 30 (2006), available at www.
fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf.
33. U.S. KiobelBrief, supra note 6, at 19.
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prohibit certain acts irrespective of the perpetrator. Nor is it necessary
to find state practice applying these norms specifically to corporations.
State practice applying a norm to natural persons generates customary
international law binding juridical persons, unless there is some differ-
ence between natural and juridical persons relevant to the norm. With
respect to the norms actionable under Sosa, there is none. Torture by a
corporation is still torture.
2012] 1051
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